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CONSUMER CONTRACT
GOVERNANCE IN A DEREGULATING
JAPAN
Veronica Taylor'
This article analyses patterns Of governance - how public and private policy networks are
managed - in consumer contracts in a deregulating Japan. It outlines the structure of Japan's
service industry and consumer problems, before considering the framework for juridical
intervention, bureaucratic regulation and pressures for further legislative activity. As the
question Of how to curb excesses Of Power in a deregulated environment governed by multiple
agents becomes more acute, consumer governance seems likely to change, and with it the utility
of current theories of how law operates in Japan.
I INTRODUCTION
The overarching question for most industrialised economies at the end of the twentieth
century is: who governs? In many areas the answer frequently seems to be not the nation
state, but the new economic sovereign - the corporation. The welfare state is in retreat,
partly because neoclassical economic ideology is in the ascendancy and partly in pragmatic
recognition that the cost of maintaining many state regulatory functions in mature or
stagnating economies is often unacceptably high.1 But reports of the death of the nation state
are also exaggerated. National governments remain the only institutions able to effectively
monitor corporations and to regulate formally, both to correct for market imperfections and
to protect citizens from market excesses and abuse. The significant change is not so much the
hollowing out of the state, but the emergence of its new role in managing inter-
organizational networks and expanding its repertoire of governance.
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law; Associate Director, Asian Law Centre, University of Melbourne.
1 See V Taylor "Global Access to Deregulated Markets in Asia: Is Competition Policy the Key?"
OECD, Regulatory Reform and International Market Openness (OECD, Paris, 1996) 233.
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This essay considers the governance of consumer transactions in Japan. Governance, of
course, now has multiple definitions.2 Here it is used in the sense of the way in which public
and private policy networks are managed. There is extensive literature surveying state
control of industry in Japan and the role of the bureaucracy in forming and applying
regulatory policy, which is not reviewed here. This essay has a more modest aim; to canvass
some of the regulatory questions surrounding the operation of consumer contracts in
contemporary Japan, and to consider the extent to which the lines of parallel governance
are likely to be redrawn in a deregulatory climate.
Consumer contracts provide a useful setting for examining legal and administrative
policy in Japan in the late 1990s, in part because Japanese attention to consumer protection
lags behind developments in the EU, Australia and New Zealand. As the Japanese service
sector grows, demands for enhanced consumer protection threaten to collide with other
policy network interests.3 One of the motifs of the new governance debate in Japan is
deregulation - although the promised program of changes has now been handballed
through four administrations. Running counter to the deregulatory push is the determination
among many bureaucrats not to cede control of regulatory jurisdictions. Current patterns of
governance in consumer transactions thus reveal a range of conflicting ideas about
contractual practice in Japan which may qualify some of the received wisdom about
Japanese law and its relationship to business.
Microeconomic analysis has tended to dominate writing on Japanese commercial
relationships in the 1980s and 19909, arguing that Japan has a form of alliance (or
strategic) capitalism that nurtures long-term, hierarchical relationships between
corporations and individuals, in which implicit agreements are made and enforced without
recourse to law.4 Frequently cited examples include the relationships between manufacturer
and parts supplier, where continuing contracts function as proxies for vertical integration5
2 Including the minimal state; corporate governance; the new public management; "good
governance"; governance as a sociocybernetic system; and as self organising network: see R
Rhodes "The New Governance: Governing without Government' (1996) XLIV Political Studies
652. See also O Williamson The Mechanisms €f Governance (OUP, Oxford, 1996).
3 M Atkinson and Coleman "Policy Networks, Police Communities and the Problems of
Governance" (1992) 5 Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 154.
4 M Gerlach Alliance Capitalism (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992).
5 See eg M Smitka Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Iapanese Automotive Industry (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1991); B Asanuma "Japanese Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in
International Perspective: The Automobile Case" in P Sheard (ed) International Adjustment and the
Japanese Firm (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992) 99; M Itoh "Organizational Transactions and
Access to the Japanese Import Market" in P Sheard (ed), above, 50.
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and assist adaptation to changes in competitive conditions.6 One of the questions which
remains unexplored is whether long-term or continuing consumer contracts in Japan can be
readily fitted within this explanatory framework.
Very little legal writing in English directly contests the microeconomic vision of
Japanese transacting patterns. Classical treatises describe the anatomy of the Civil and
Commercial Codes and special laws.7 A popular, but dated, counterpart literature describes
the cultural uniqueness of Japanese contracts in action. In the latter genre, the civil law, the
judiciary and legal services are depicted as irrelevant for commercial actors, who prefer to
order their relationships through informal means. Contract litigation is rare, it is claimed,
because the Japanese have a cultural aversion to litigation.8 More recent arguments are that
contract litigation is made inaccessible by government and bureaucratic elites who view
public commercial litigation as socially destabilising,9 or that the Japanese are also
rational actors who can - and do - bargain in the shadow of the law.10 More recent
work on judicial responses to contract disputes qualifies the received wisdom by pointing
to the significance of the courts and judicial intervention as a valve for both escaping and
adjusting continuing contractual ties.11 There is, however, a striking absence of empirical
data informing legal scholarship in English about Japanese commercial contracts and quasi-
6 Sheard, above n 5.
7 See eg Z Kitagawa Doing Business in Japan (Matthew Bender, New York, looseleaf); H Oda Japanese
Law (Butterworths, London, 1992).
8 See eg T Kawashima (1967) Nihonjin no Ho Ishiki [The Legal Consciousness of the Japanese]
(1967); T Kawashima (C Stevens trans) "Contract Consciousness of the Japanese" (1974) 7 Law in
Japan 1, T Kawashima "Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan" iii A von Mehren (ed) Law
in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society (Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass, 1963) 41. See also
the extracts on contracting in Y Yanagida et al (eds) Law and Investment in japan: Cases and
Materials (Harvard University Press; Cambridge Mass, 1994); N Kashiwagi and A Zaloom
"Contract Law and the Japanese Negotiation Process" in G McAlinn (ed) The Business Guide to
Japan (Reed Publishing, Singapore, 1996) 85.
9 J Haley Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox (OUP, Oxford, 1992).
10 See eg J M Ramseyer "Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan" (1988) 14
Journal of Japanese Studies 112.
11 T Uchida Keiyaku no saisei [The Rebirth of Contract] (Kobundo, Tokyo, 1990); G Rahn Rechtsdenken
und Rechtsau#assung in Japan [Legal Thought and the Conception of Law in Japan] (C H Beck,
Munchen, 1990); V Taylor 'Continuing Transactions and Persistent Myths: Contracts in
Contemporary Japan' (1993) 19 MULR 352.
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contractual relationships.12 This gap will begin to close once the results of a number of
current projects are published.13
In the meantime, it may be useful to reassess the way in which Japanese contracting has
been framed to date. The microeconomic preoccupation with horizontal and vertical
commercial ties has tended to obscure the scope and variety of contract types within the
Japanese economy. For the most part, the contractual relationship is depicted as a
neoclassical binary exchange, embedded in the broader cultural milieu of the parties'
identities and the industry setting. When a dispute arises between two commercial actors,
they either ignore the default rules furnished by law and bargain in its shadow, or - much
less frequently - they, invoke legal rules through litigation. These representations
reinforce the dualism of a contract model in which the parties' transactional norms (and/or
industry practices) are expected to diverge from legal rules. Alternatively Japanese
contracts are viewed along the axis of the state as regulator of individual corporations, a
key example being the progressive expansion of the Japan Fair Trade Commission and the
impact of the Anti-Monopoly Law in the 1990s on vertical and horizontal transactional
relationships.14
The problem with these trajectories for viewing Japanese contracts is that they are
overly simplistic. In Japan, as in Australia and New Zealand, contractual relationships are
shaped and regulated on multiple levels, by multiple agents. As Macaulay and others have
pointed out, contract relationships are formed and performed through the processes of
governance, within a matrix comprising the contract parties (their employees, relationship
and relative economic leverage); the structure of the industry (schemes of self regulation,
bureaucratic directives and guidance); cultural mores and ideology; formal legal rules; court
generated norms; and intervention by third parties such as government inspectors, bankers
and lawyers.15
12 But cf R Dore Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Iapanese Economy
1970-1980 (The Athlone Press, London, 1986).
13 Preliminary results from one project include: M Kato "Nihonjin no keiyakukan Uapanese Attitudes
to Contracts]" (1996) 1096 Jurisuto 44. See also L Nottage "Economic Dislocation and Contract
Renegotiation in New Zealand and Japan: A Preliminary Empirical Study" (1997) 27 VUWLR 59.
14 Law No 54, 1947. See K Sanekata and S Wilks, "The Fair Trade Commission and the Enforcement
of Competition Policy In Japan" in Doern and Wilks (eds) Comparative Competition Policy
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) 139.
15 S Macaulay "Long-Term Continuing Relations: The Amercian Experience Regulating Dealerships
and Franchises" in C Joerges (ed) Franchising the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in
Europe and the United States (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1991) 179. Of the current
theoretical studies of law in Japan, F Upham Low and Society in Postwar Japan (Harvard UP,
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This broader picture of contract governance is important. At a basic empirical level it
should lift our focus beyond the stasis of many existing doctrinal and cultural descriptions.
In particular, it should enable us to gauge the extent to which economic change acts as a
catalyst for shifts in contract design and their legal regulation. In a period of intense
globalisation this is significant because the legal responses to global economic expansion
and restructuring are local and often culturally specific. A more nuanced picture of the
operation and regulation of contracts in Japan is a prerequisite for meaningful comparisons,
but also potentially important because of the way in which Japan is viewed as a model for
legal reforms and development in developing economies such as Indonesia and Vietnam.
II THE OTHER IAPANESE ECONOMY: SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED
SERVICE ENTERPRISES
More and more of the incidents of daily life are being regulated by contracts with
private corporations. Personal freedom is increasingly delimited, not by state regulation but
by corporate controls on access to education and technical qualifications; eligibility for
credit cards, loans and financial products; control of data about personal details and
consumption patterns. The state, too, is progressively vacating provision of other social
goods such as public safety (eg the rise of private policing)16; labour market protections (eg
abandonment of centralized wage bargaining and instituionalised unionism); and the
supply of basic commodities (eg privatisation of public utilities). In Japan, as elsewhere,
consumer transactions are one of the frontlines in the realignment of the new economic
order.
Some of these changes are reflected in the growth of the domestic and export service
sectors of mature industrialised economies. Typically, new consumer services take the form
of standardized contracts of adhesion which extend over time. For lawyers and public
policy makers in the EU, North America, Australia and New Zealand, the question for much
of the 1970s and 1980s was how to balance the tension between contract welfarism and
market capitalism: whether the state should defer to the demands of neoclassical economics
and treat these transactions as planned risk allocation between rational actors, or whether
it should intervene to monitor the corporate morality of contract creation, performance and
dispute resolution. State intervention was assumed to be either specialised legislation
covering an industry sector or type of problem, or judicial responses to the small number of
litigated consumer cases. In the 1990s, the complexity of transactions has increased and the
legalisation of problem solving has intensified. We now recognize, too, that the binary
representation of the state directing its intervention at an industry or individual (at the
Cambridge Mass, 1987) most successfully employs this wider framework, applying it to four public
law case studies.
16 Eg D Bayley and C Shearing "The Future of Policing" (1996) 30 Law & Soc'y Rev 585.
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behest of competing lobbyists) is an inadequate representation of the contours of
governance.
The indications from political science are that patterns of governance are diverse, and
vary for individual economic sectors.17 This is a significant hypothesis for the present
discussion because the structure of the consumer service sector in Japan is considerably
removed from the standard depiction of Japanese industry. The flagships of manufacturing
and their affiliated trading companies and banks have always been somewhat
unrepresentative of the wider economy; most Japanese work in small and medium sized
enterprises. Keywords in financial press of the 1990s are cost cutting, retrenchment and
outsourcing. Larger institutions are gradually dismantling growth period employment
practices such as lifetime employment, seniority-linked remuneration and in-house training
of generalists. Employee responses to the changing climate include dokuritsu (setting up an
independent business), joining an FC (buying a franchise outlet), and semon shitauke
(becoming a specialist supplier, often to a former employer). Overall unemployment rates in
the 1990s have remained fairly stable, in part because of underemployment at large
corporations, but also because the so-called new service sector has also absorbed
voluntarily and involuntarily retrenched middle managers, younger white collar workers,
and university graduates failing to secure jobs with large companies. Employment in the
service sector increased by about 15% between 1989 and 1994.18
More than a third of Japan's service business has been established after 1980. They now
produce about 80% of the value of the retail sector output and about 25% of the value of
Japan's manufacturing sector, but are growing much faster than either. Figures for 1989 to
1994 show a growth rate of 46.9% for domestic services, in comparison with 20.3% for
retailing and 0.5% for manufacturing.19 The most profitable service for the same period was
pachinko (adult pinball gambling). This is hardly surprising - casual empiricism confirms
that pachinko parlors are springing up everywhere. Some estimates suggest that the industry
has doubled in size over the last 5 years and is now worth 30 trillion yen, or 40% of the
national budget.20 Some way behind pachinko follow services provided by Japanese style
inns; advertising agencies; timber construction; computer software; and industrial
equipment leasing. Of themselves, however, the figures, are not really indicative of the
17 See above n 3.
18 Chushokigyocho [Small and Medium Sized Business Agency] (ed) Nyu sabisugyo hakusho [New
Service Industry White Paper] (Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1996) 198.
19 Above n 18, 202, using figures from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry statistics
(Shogyo tokeichosa and Kogyo tokeichosa).
20 Teikoku Data Bank figures, quoted in Mainichi Shimbun, "Shakeout Seen Coming as Pachinko
Wars Rage" (20/1/1997) 14.
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volatility or the future outlook of individual service businesses. Pachinko, for example, is
expanding rapidly as operators transform grubby pinball arcades into entertainment
complexes appealing more to the female market. However, the effects of Japan's "bubble
period" expansion are also evident. While 130 parlors opened in Japan last year, 57
pachiko businesses also declared bankruptcy.
Japan's service businesses are almost evenly divided between those targeting individual
consumers (46.2%) and those providing services for industry (43.9%).21 In the personal
service sector, however, the overwhelming number of providers (82.2%) are individuals
rather than incorporated entities. Even in the services for industry sector, 41% of service
providers are individuals, and of the remaining 58% which are legal entities, only half are
incorporated as companies.22 Calculated by size (ie the number of outlets and employees)
the largest service providers to individuals are beauty salons; personal tutors; esthetic
salons providing body and face care; laundry services; Japanese style inns; driving schools;
recreation facilities; parking lots; machinery repairs and photographers.23 The largest
service providers to industry are: timber construction services; miscellaneous specialist
services; accounting and tax services; Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Cooperatives;
information services; leasing; administrative and judicial scriveners; advertising; and law
office and patent office services.24 In each case these represent older, established business
types, but the government figures are selective. Entertainment and gambling services such as
pachinko, which is classified and regulated as a business affecting public morals (fuzoku
eigyo) are included, but (unless it constitutes a 'miscellaneous' service) the extensive and
institutionalised sex industry is not.
Government predictions about the sectors in which new services are expected to expand
are similarly conservative.25 Over the last two to three years, however, the most noticeable
growth has been in newer services. The Small and Medium Sized Business Agency defines
new service businesses as those that either provide new services or that have segmented
existing services by giving them a new institutional form (eg chain stores, franchising); those
which have developed new forms of service delivery; services which use new forms of
technology; services which trade on internationalisation (movement of people and goods);
and services which consolidate a number of elements to create new value added.26 Examples
21 Above n 18, 198.
22 Above n 18, 199.
23 Above n 18, 176.
24 Above n 18, 178.
25 Above n 18, 11.
26 Above n 18, 19.
-
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include house cleaning services tailored for elderly people; a franchise chain of quick
massage services; retirement homes which allow pets; baby-sitting services which take and
collect children from day care; middle and high school tutoring services that provide
materials via fax; temporary office staff services offering internship placements to female
college graduates; personal computer leasing; sporting goods buy back and recycle services;
and e-mail translation services.27
Many of the new services replicate patterns of consumption in other industrialised
economies, such as the growth in personalised health and beauty services. Others represent
the institutionalisation and expansion of traditional services such as home tutoring and
English instruction. Many respond to the aging population (private aged care and home
nursing) and to the needs of working women (child care, home cleaning). Some trade on
instability in the labour market and the strong Japanese tradition of obtaining
qualifications (computer software courses, bookkeeping and accounting qualifications, and
certification in everything from landscape gardening to calligraphy).
Despite a tendency to see new service industry growth on an ever upward trend, it is
more likely that these service businesses suffer from the same mixed fates as most small
businesses. For every new operation that opens there is another that closes, due to lack of
credit, inexperience, or inability to predict and respond to consumer preferences.28
III ANATOMY OF CONSUMER PROBLEMS
When consumers purchase services from this sector they face the perennial problems of
asymmetry of information and experience, as well as the danger that the service provider
will engage in sharp practice, be unable to provide the service promised, get into financial
difficulty, or simply go out of business and disappear. Citizens' advice bureaus and
consumer complaints centres began to register significant numbers of complaints about
service contracts from around 1990 onwards.29
Analysis of computer records for consumer complaints in 1995 by the Japan Federation
of Bar Associations identified four main problem areas: esthetic services; foreign language
schools; home tutoring services; and university entrance prep schools. In each case the
number of complaints and inquiries recorded by local government consumer centres and
citizens' advice bureaus quadrupled between 1986 and 1992, with a dramatic increase after
27 Above n 18, 186.
28 See generally the figures for closures in above n 18.
29 See generally, Nichibenren Shohishamodai Taisaku Iinkai Uapanese Federation of Bar Associations
Consumer Issues Committee] (ed) Keizokuteki sabisu torihiki: shoshisha toraburu kaiketsusaku
[Continuing Service Transactions: Strategies for Resolving Consumer Problems] (1995) 32 NBL
Bessatsu 2.
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1990.30 Consumer Centre staff estimate that complaints received represent about 4% of the
actual incidence of problems. This rule of thumb contemplates the difficulty of getting though
on a limited number of phone lines, the limits to staffing and the reality that the centres offer
no enforcement mechanisms.31 This may account for the pattern of establishing consumer
service and Bar Association "hotlines" for problem areas such as esthetic services, in an
effort to better gauge the extent of the problem.
Consumer service contracts extend across a wide range of businesses, but they also
share some characteristics. The first is some ambiguity about the content and the quality of
the service to be provided. In most cases the service is highly personalised, and its efficacy
depends in part on a subjective assessment by the consumer. Typically there is a gap
between what was promised or advertised, and what the consumer understands that they
are receiving. Whether the gap arises because of a breach of contract or failure to perform
according to the terms is often difficult to assess.
Analysed from a legal viewpoint, consumer complaints cluster around issues of
disclosure, formation, performance and termination. Often the problem is combined with the
sales method. Recent problems include telephone sales of qualifications, where a unsolicited
sales call to the consumer's home or office elicits an oral response such as "Yes" or "Thank
you" (but meaning "No thank you"), which the service provider subsequently treats as assent
to a contract and the basis for demanding payment. Door to door sales, on the other hand,
account for more than half of the complaints in relation to home tutoring in the Japan
Federation of Bar Association's study.
From the service providers' point of view, the risk of consumer dissatisfaction is
substantially lessened by using a detailed, standard form contract which discourages
complaints. For a nation with a supposed aversion to contracts in writing, these consumer
contracts represent masterpieces of restrictive drafting. In most cases the contract is to be
performed in instalments over time, but all fees are payable in advance and are subject to a
no refunds clause.
In the past tutoring was paid for monthly, but the shift to payment in advance has been
accelerated by linking the main agreement to a credit contract with a third party credit
provider. As with any credit arrangement, when repayments to the credit company are made
in instalments, the consumer has the feeling that the payment for the service is taking place
monthly, when in fact the contract price has been paid in advance. Problems arise when the
service provider goes bankrupt or when the consumer is no longer able to receive the
30 The figures for individual centres in Tokyo and regional centres vary, but total around 10,000
complaints in this category: see above n 29.
31 Personal communication.
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service, but the credit obligation remains. The credit company may direct the consumer to
continue with the contract at another location, and the consumer may find this inconvenient
or inappropriate, or the original service may simply be inadequate and the consumer may
want to terminate the agreement. The question in most cases is whether the consumer can
terminate the agreement and receive a refund and/or damages. The answer is by no means
clear. It depends on which rules are invoked from which of several interrelated universes:
the transactional relationship between the parties, with or without intervention by
lawyers; the self-regulatory Codes of Conduct and model contracts devised by the
bureaucracy and industry representatives; or the judicial remedies of the Civil Code.
IV THE FRAMEWORK FOR IURIDICAL INTERVENTION
Japan has no general consumer protection legislation. Many lawyers argue that the
absence is not accidental - that it reflects a political choice to privilege industry interests,
especially those of manufacturing, during the 1960s and 1970s. Legislative controls on
merchant behaviour in consumer transactions remain piecemeal and indirect.
At one level merchant behaviour is constrained by the Antimonopoly Law (AML),
monitored and enforced by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), and the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law.32 In practice, neither law offers effective remedies to
consumers affected by unfair trading. Both focus primarily on acts that harm commercial
competitors, and neither law directly invalidates contracts which incorporate provisions
found to contravene the legislation. Although article 45(1) of the AML allows complainants
to request the JFTC to report and take appropriate measures in response to a complaint, the
decision to do so is purely discretionary. The JFTC to date has been unwilling to initiate
action based on consumer complaints,33 and attempts to compel them to change decisions
directly affecting consumer interests have generally been unsuccessful, in part because
Japanese courts interpret standing requirements strictly.34 As Matsumoto points out, the
only remedial route at this level for consumers is to claim damages for the tort liability of
the JFTC as a state agency under the State Compensation Law.35 Again, precedent to date
32 Law No 47, 1993.
33 T Matsumoto "EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract and Japan: Does the
Japanese Law Meet the Standards Set By the Directive?" (1994) 2 Consumer LJ 141. Note,
however, the JFTC warning to the esthetic industry in 1987 about misleading advertising in
relation to weight loss: above n 29,7.
34 See eg Supreme Court (14 March 1978) 32 Minshu 21 (denying a consumer group standing to
challenge an administrative disposition by the JFTC regarding fruit juice pricing).
3 5 Law No 125, 1947.
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suggests that the evidentiary burden - the requirement to show that the loss would not have
occurred but for the discretionary decision taken - generally makes this unfeasible.36
Government intervention in consumer transactions has tended to be reactive and take
the form of other special legislative provisions which invalidate 'unfair' provisions in
consumer contracts.37 In many cases, this special legislation is enacted outside the Civil
Code in order to 'siphon off' litigation in problem areas.38 This pattern accounts for the
enactment of the Door to Door Sales Law; the Instalment Sales Law; and more recent
interventions such as the 1992 Law Regulating Membership for Golf Courses.39
The genesis of the Product Liability Law, (PL Law) was somewhat different.40 The PL
Law is regarded by some commentators as the first stage in the emergence of a new wave of
consumer protection, influenced particularly by legal developments in the EU. The passage
of the PL Law was vigorously opposed by manufacturers, on the grounds that it was likely
lead to an explosion of product liability litigation along the lines of the American
experience. This, industry argued, would reduce consumer welfare by adding to production
costs. Nothing of the kind has happened so far. The brief core provisions of the PL law
create a no-fault scheme of liability in which consumers need only show that physical
and/or economic harm resulted from use of a (defective) product, with the court inferring
causation. The legislation itself does not represent a major doctrinal departure from case
law to this point. Nor are judges in Japan's non-jury system expected to depart radically
from their practice of awarding relatively low damages, and like other civil law
jurisdictions Japan has no tradition of awarding punitive damages. Procedurally, the PL
Law is also hedged with a scheme of mediation and conciliation centres endorsed by a
variety of Government agencies, which seek to settle consumer claims without recourse to
the courts. In early 1997, for example, the consumer policy section chief of the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) reiterated the Ministry's stated policy of
36 See eg Tokyo District Court (22 April 1992) 1431 Hanrei Jiho 72, cited in Matsumoto, above n 33.
37 See eg arts 9 and 30 of the House Lease and Land Lease Law (providing notice periods in favour
of consumers); art 5 of the Instalment Sales Law (limiting the damages claimable from consumers
in case of contract cancellation); art 6 of the same law (applying a cooling off period in favour of
consumers).
38 L Nottage "Form and Substance in US, English, New Zealand and Japanese Law: A Framework
for Better Comparisons of Development in the Law of Unfair Contracts" (1996) 26 VUWLR 247,
280 (quoting Nakaya).
3 9 Respectively, Law No 57, 1976; Law No 159, 1961; Law No 53, 1992.
4 0 Law No 85, 1994. See generally M Kato 5eizobutsu Sekininho Soran [Surve·. of Product Liability
Law] (Shojihomukenkyukai, Tokyo, 1994).
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continued "positive support of speedy, simplified dispute resolution by third parties outside
courts, using the so-called PL centres".41
At the local level, there are a cluster of ordinances passed by preferectural and local
assemblies that specifically target fair trading in consumer transactions and provide, inter
alia, for cooling off periods. There is little indication in the legal literature that these have
anything more than hortatory effect.42 None of the national 'special' laws is directly
applicable to consumer service contracts, except insofar as these are combined with the sale
of products. For the most part, legal complaints about consumer services have to be argued
within the framework of the Civil Code.
In the world of the Civil Code, continuing contracts for the provision of services are
contracts of quasi mandate (article 656). They are distinguished from a contract of mandate,
which is for the performance of a legal act (article 643), and from a sub contract for the
performance of work, where the purpose of the contract is not only the work performed but
also production of a defined outcome (eg construction, cleaning: article 632). In principle, a
contract of quasi mandate can be terminated at the option of either party at any time (article
651(1)); but where the termination unfavorably affects the other party, the terminating
party has a obligation to pay damages for loss sustained by the other party (article 651(2)).
The exception to the rule is where termination is sought for an unavoidable reason; the
rationale being that contracts for mandate and quasi mandate depend on the existence of a
trust relationship between the parties, and where this has broken down it is illogical to
treat the contract as binding.43 The right to claim for damages for termination of these kinds
of contracts has been interpreted as being limited to the reliance damage sustained because
of sudden termination, not the full value of the unperformed part of the contract. In most
cases this should equate to the value of the appointment or part of the performance
occurring immediately after the notice to terminate is received.44
Of course, contract parties are free to contract out of provisions of the Civil Code that
are not mandatory. Here, the doctrinal question impacting on consumer choice is whether,
where there is a standard form contract provision that expressly prohibits early
termination, consumers should be taken to have waived their right to terminate the services
41 F Ota "Tsushostingyosho no shoshisha gyosei no tenbo [Future Directions for MITI's consumer
administration]" (1997) 608 NBL 19,
42 See the example analysed by Nottage, above n 38,286; and "Shoshisha torihiki no tekiseika ni mukete
[Toward the Regulation of Consumer Transactions: 15th Annual Report of the Consumer Policy
Section, Citizen's Lifestyle Commission, December 1996]" (1997) 608 NBL 61.
43 Above n 29, 14.
44 Cf the approach in commercial continuing contracts: Taylor, above n 11.
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contract before the full term expires. The scholarly and administrative consensus appears to
be that such provisions do not extinguish the right to terminate the contract, but equally do
not excuse the obligation to pay damages. At the same time, they do not give rise to an
obligation to refund monies already paid under the contract.45
Where the services are provided under a standard form consumer contract, the basis for
claiming a right to terminate and the right to receive a refund or claim damages has to be
found elsewhere. In practice, claims often proceed in tort, but here the two main contract
strategies are considered. One is to terminate on the basis of breach by the service provider.
Typically this will be possible where the service provider goes bankrupt or is unable to
continue providing the service, eg because of a change of business location. Alternatively
the claim may turn on the quality of the service provided, and this will depend on the nature
of the explanation and advertising received at the time that the contract was made.46
Secondly, where it is difficult to establish a clear breach, the consumer may assert the
right to terminate based on the jurisprudence of the general provisions of the Civil Code:
breach of public policy and good morals (article 90); good faith (article 1(2)); or abuse of
right (article 1 (3)). Conceptually these are separate grounds of action; but courts, and
especially plaintiff attorneys, frequently use the concepts interchangeably.
If a consumer contract contravenes public policy and good morals, it will be void.
Accordingly, courts are relatively reluctant to recognize this claim, but there is case law in
relation to standard form contracts, for example, that finds that an unreasonable limitation
on the amount of damages claimable under the contract would contravene the mandatory
public policy requirement of the Civil Code.47
This jurisprudence could be used to combat the practice of withholding refunds of
prepaid contract monies on the ground that they constituted a pre-estimate of damages for
contract cancellation. The problem with asserting this in the past was that there was no
standard against which the amount being withheld could be assessed. As the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations now points out, the adjustment of model contracts in the
four 'problem' sectors identified above now provides some yardsticks because the model
45 Above n 29, 16.
46 See eg Osaka District Court (4 February 1993) 1481 Hanji 14; and the commentary by H Hirano in
A Morishima and S Itoh (eds) Shohis/m torihiki hanrei hyakusen [A Hundred Selected Consumer
Cases] (November 1995) 135 Bessatsu Jurisuto 118.
47 See T Matsumoto Shohishakeiyaku ni okeru fukoseijokono kisei - EU to nihon no hikaku [The
Regulation of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts - The EC and Japan Compared], in
unpublished Conference Proceedings "EU-Japan Legal Dialogue: Contract" (November 21 and 22
19'96, Kyoto Comparative Law Center).
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contracts stipulate upper limits for contract cancellation charges.48 Attempts to withhold
amounts greater than those stipulated in the model contracts can be argued to be void for
public policy and good morals on the basis that they offend against the reasonable contract
practices of the industry.49
A broader ground for challenging consumer contract fairness is the doctrine of good
faith. This has been applied by Japanese courts in a number of ways. The most recent
significant cases for consumer problems are the so-called Dial Q2 (or fee for call telephone
numbers providing information services including telephone sex). In Japan, as elsewhere,
one group of cases concerns the liability of the householder to pay charges incurred without
their permission, usually by children. Here, the standard form contracts with telephone
company NTT typically imposed liability on the householder who was party to the
contract. Despite the wording of such clauses, Japanese courts in a series of decisions have
found that, where the amount in issue is exceedingly high, it would be unreasonable and
therefore a breach of good faith to allow the telephone company to enforce the claim against
the householder.50
A further subset of this ground is unavoidable reason, such as long term illness or a
change of residence, which viewed objectively would make continuation of the contract
extremely difficult. At least one view also holds that in contracts where the basis of the
contract is confidence in the service provider, such as contracts for educational services,
loss of confidence by the consumer may of itself be sufficient to amount to a unavoidable
reason for termination.51
Some case law and scholarly writing also suggests that the neighboring doctrine of
abuse of right can also be mobilized to assert a right to terminate, although this is also
contested. Where it has been used, it has often been grounded in a failure to disclose
important information, or a failure to perform a duty to explain. An interesting, if unusual,
example is the decision of the Nagoya District Court, which held that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover part of the 5,896,000 Yen (NZ $75,000) paid to a Buddhist priest in order
to cure the plaintiff's child of natural deafness.52 The court held that the treatment itself did
48 In the case of esthetic treatments, 10% of the balance of the contract amount, or within JPY
20,000; in the case of prep schools, within one months tuition fee; in the case of English language
schools, 20% of the balance of the contract amount or JPY 10,000.
49 Above n 29,20.
50 See Matsumoto, above n 47.
51 Above n 29, 19.
52 31 March 1983 (1081) Hanji 104. See also the commentary by H Itoh in A Morishima and S Itoh
(eds) above n 46, 124.
CONSUMER CONTRACT GOVERNANCE IN A DEREGULATING JAPANi 113
not breach public policy and good morals; but that the failure to inform the parent that a
cure was unlikely after the promised year had elapsed and the child had been treated 700
times "exceeded the bounds of what could be deemed socially acceptable", and that the
balance of the contract was void for abuse of right.53
Thus the core remedies for consumer contract problems currently have to be
extrapolated from a Civil Code which, while it contemplates continuing contracts for the
provision of services, provides no customised principles for dealing with the problems of
contractual disclosure in consumer settings or early termination. Uchida argues the general
provisions of the Japanese Civil Code have been singularly important in developing case
law and jurisprudence to bridge the gap between the framework of the Civil Code and the
social expectations and immanent norms that attach to the performance and resolution of
problems in continuing contracts.54 Matsumoto, on the other hand, points out that the courts
to date have not usually distinguished between standard form contracts and those
bargained for by the parties. The result, he suggests, is that courts have tended to read down
the scope of some boiler plate clauses (reibun) in the kind of pre-printed contracts purchased
at stationery stores regarding residential leases or compromises made after a traffic
accident, on the basis that one or other party did not consent to the content. One the whole,
however, he suggests that courts have been comparatively willing to enforce standard form
contracts without inquiring into the terms.55 Perhaps for this reason, Omura argues that
utility of the public policy and good morals provision of the Code and in particular the use
of the concept of abuse of right needs to be reinvigorated as a control on standard form
contracts in consumer settings.56
Japan's general clause jurisprudence on consumer contracting is well-developed, but it
suffers from the obvious drawbacks of case law as a remedial framework. Because the
judicial response is reactive to particular problems, the resulting case law is neither
necessarily consistent or complete. More importantly, juridical intervention has to be
activated by filing suit, which - until the revisions to the Code of Civil Procedure
discussed below - effectively insulated service providers from consumer claims.
53 Itoh, above n 52, 124.
54 T Uchida, above n 11, 223ff; T Uchida "Gendai keiyakuhd no aratana tenkai to ippanjoko [New
Developments in Contemporary Contract Law and General Clauses]" (1994) NBL Nos 514-517.
55 Matsumoto, above n 47.
56 A Omura Kojoryozoku to keiyaku seigi [Public Policy, Good Morals and Contract Justice] (Tokyo,
Yuhikaku, 1995).
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V REGULATION THROUGH BUREAUCRATIC INTERVENTION
Up to this point, the framework of regulation and relationships looks fairly clear:
consumers and service providers transact, and where there is conflict, the law provides
general contract principles and case law jurisprudence. In fact, the relevant policy network
is crowded and contentious. For the service providers, the responsible nominate agency is
the MITI's Small and Medium Sized Business Agency (Chushokigyocho) and the core legal
vehicle for government policy is the Basic Law on Small and Medium Sized Enterprises,57
around which constellate more than 30 other special laws enacted to support and
restructure small business. The Agency's 1996 White Paper also proposes a further
legislative package of incentives and protections for these businesses, but there are no
indications of legislative movement in this direction for the present.58
In the consumer service sector the policy players include the Service Industry Section of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry; the Economic Planning Agency; local
government; government and local government services such as the Citizen Life Centres
(Kokumin Seikatst, Senta) and the Consumer Welfare Bureaus (Shohisha Seikatst, Senta); the
Japan Federation of Bar Associations; industry associations; government/industry self-
regulatory bodies; credit providers; academic and policy advisors; and consumer groups.
A Applying Lateral Pressure: Tsutatsu Gyosei
When consumer service contract problems began to surface (or began to be
acknowledged) in the mid-80s, MITI responded with the bureaucratic staple, the Research
Group Report.59 During the late 19809, amendments to both the Door to Door Sales Law
and the Installment Sales Law were debated and local governments, consumer groups and
Bar Associations formed a range of study groups and hotlines to deal with the burgeoning
number of complaints about service contracts relating to esthetic services and cram schools.
MITI then used administrative guidance (gyosei shido) to the credit industry in 1992,
requesting credit providers to carry out stricter investigation and approval before
providing consumer credit facilities to new chain stores or retail affiliates in sectors
providing continuing consumer services.60 This was followed with a formal administrative
circular (tsutatst,) to the Japan Credit Industry Association and the National Credit
Association which directed that:61
57 Law No 154, 1961.
58 Above n 18, 172.
59 Yakumutorihikitoi kenkykai hokokusho (May 1986): see above n 29,7.
60 Above n 29,7.
61 Above n 29. 23.
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In a case where a so-called esthetic salon, foreign language conversations school, entrance
exam school or home tutoring service is an affiliate or chain store of [a company] providing
continuing services and becomes unable to do so either because of bankruptcy or for other
reasons, [you are required to] immediately cease requests for payment to consumer. Note that
this requirement can be substituted with an arrangement where the same service as that
stipulated in the contract between the consumer and chain store or affiliate can be provided
through other means and the consumer consents to this.
Direction by means of administrative circulars is a standard channel through which
administrative bodies direct subordinate bodies over which they have a regulatory
jurisdiction. Of themselves circulars are not a source of law; they are binding within the
administration, but have no legal force in relation to citizens or the courts. They do,
however, have a de facto effect on third party conduct because one can expect the law to be
applied in line with the circular unless there is a foreseeable challenge or dispute about the
content.
In this case MITI had a dual problem. On the one hand, it sought to direct credit
providers to act as a preemptive, lateral control on service outlets. On the other hand, the
subsequent tsutatsu was necessary because credit providers themselves were exacerbating
consumer conflicts by insisting that the credit contract was entirely separate from the
service contract, and therefore valid, regardless of any problems the consumer was having
with the service provider. As the tst,tatsu recognizes and lawyers point out, credit
companies were (and are) often instrumental in pressuring the consumer to accept a
substitute service elsewhere and preserve the credit contract intact.
B Directed 'Self-Regulation'
Between 1988 and 1995, each of the 'problem' sectors established one or more industry
associations, partly at the direction of MITI and partly in anticipation of new legislative
controls being applied to them. This kind of directed 'self-regulation' is ubiquitous in Japan,
but not uniquely so.62 In many Japanese industries, bureaucratic leverage is sustained
through the legislative requirement that commercial actors in the industry adopt and use a
standard form contract approved by the relevant Ministry, either requiring prior
permission (ninka) or requiring subsequent reporting (todokede).63 In practice this takes two
62 Cf eg N Tollemache "Taking the Ombudsman Concept into the Private Sector: Notes on the
Banking Ombudsman Scheme in New Zealand" (1996) 26 VUWLR 233.
63 Matsumoto, above n 47, quotes the example of the Telecommunications Law (Law No 87, 1980)
which requires primary telecommunications providers to have their standard form contracts
approved in advance by the Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications (art 31(1)) but allows
special secondary providers to simply the content of theirs (art 31(5)) and exempts general
secondary providers.
-
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forms. For one group of industries, whether the standard form contract is approved at the
ninka or todokede stage, it is mandatory.64 Matsumoto notes that, though consumer groups
may be consulted in the formulation of these contracts, at the end of the day they are
basically drafted by the relevant Ministry and announced by the responsible regulatory
agency.65 In contrast to this, a second type of standard form contract is usually developed
for industries where there is no legislative basis for regulating entry to the industry or
contracts used within it. In this case, the bureaucracy uses administrative guidance to
encourage industry associations to draft a standard form contract and recommend the
adoption of this'model contract' by association members. These contracts are then examined
and critiqued by bureaucrats, by consumer organisations, and by the National Life Council
(Kokumin Seikatsu Shingikai); and in a number of cases have been revised as a result.66
In the service sector examples discussed above, none of the 'problem' service providers
had (or were required to have) approved contracts. MITI took the view that 'self-
regulation' was preferable to specialised legislation, and effected this through developing a
series of 'model contracts' with the industry associations between 1992 and 1994.67
The new model contracts are intended to operate as de facto legislation. In the case of the
esthetic industry example, the contract is annotated with instructions for operators about
what each clause means and what measures they should take when explaining the contract
to consumers.68 The model contracts for consumers are supplemented with a series of
industry regulations and guidelines developed by each industry association, that seek to
restrain illegal or inappropriate acts by operators.69
64 Examples include the Travel Industry Law (Law No 239) arts 12-2 and 12-3, the Home Delivery
Service Standard Form Contract and the Transport Removal Contract under the Road Transport
Law (Law No 183, 1951) arts 62 and 11; the Standard Trunkroom (Storage Facility) Contract
under the Warehousing Industry Law (Law No 121, 1956) art 8.
65 Above n 47.
66 The latter, under the aegis of the Prime Minister's Office, has reviewed standardised consumer
contracts in a range of industries, including life insurance, travel, marriage and funeral services,
consumer banking, auto sales, credit cards, golf clubs (1981); transport of goods, hotels,
warehousing, banking and non-life insurance (1984); and old age homes, sports clubs, resort clubs
and household good rentals (1988): see Matsumoto, above n 33.
67 Reproduced in above n 29.
68 Above n 29, 121.
69 In the esthetic industry, this takes the form of a standard contract intended to bind members of
wither the Japan Estheticians Association and the Japan Esthetic Industry Association: above n
29, 132. The Standard Agreement prohibits, inter alia, acts such as: claims about results which
have not basis in science and would not normally be possible; comparative advertising directed at
other salons or products; use of fictional examples or inaccurate data; use of public figures'
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VI LAWYERS AS AGENTS AND LEGISLATIVE LOBBYISTS
The Japan Federation of Bar Associations' response to these bureaucratic initiatives
has been largely negative. While lawyers concede that the model contracts represent an
improvement on past practice, they are critical of many of the provisions. The contracts, for
example, do concede the de facto right of consumers to terminate early, but constrain this by
imposing a prescribed fee.
Lawyers argue, too, that the model contract/industry guideline model does not resolve
one of the core consumer issues - the right to use the breach of the consumer service contract
as the basis for termination (or defending non-performance) of the consumer credit contract.
Thus the Japan Federation of Bar Association stance is fundamentally to lobby for, and
support the introduction ot specialist legislation.
The 1996 Report from the National Life Council goes further, arguing that specialist
legislation is required urgently.70 The Committee behind the report includes both academic
and practising lawyers. One of the powerful 'push' factors for the report is clearly the
introduction of the EU Directive on Unfair Consumer Contract Terms. Consumer law
specialists such as Matsumoto suggest that, ideally, Japanese legislation would go further
than the Directive, by covering the pre-formation stage of consumer contracting as well as
monitoring the fairness of contract provisions.71
The rationale for legislative intervention in this report, however, is clearly economic
efficiency. The Economic Planning Agency argues that the current state of the case law is
inadequate because it is an unreliable predictor of outcomes in individual cases, and that
there would be benefit for both consumers and industry operators in articulating the
situations in which good faith; public policy and abuse of rights are likely to be infringed
by service contract behaviour.72 The report expresses this as the need to make the civil law
"rules" clear - a formula favored by economic commentators, but somewhat at odds with the
trend within contract law worldwide to move beyond neoclassical rules to the imposition
of "standards".
photographs without permission; claims about facilities that are open to misinterpretation; use of
doctored photographs; acts which conflict, or may conflict with regulatory laws covering
pharmacists, acupuncture practitioners, shiatsu practitioners, etc.
70 "Shoshisha torihiki no tekiseika ni mukete [Toward the Regulation of Consumer Transactions]", above
n 42.
71 Matsumoto, above n 47, 13.
72 "Shoshisha torijiki no tekiseika ni mukete [Toward the Regulation of Consumer Transactions]", above
-I
n 42.
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If the proposed legislation is seen as symbolic or preemptive - signaling a sea-change in
the policy environment - then we are likely to see something like the pattern emerging in
relation to product liability, where policy network players protect their interests in
different ways. Thus MITI may move to coerce or cajole alternative dispute resolution to
defuse potential litigation; manufacturers insure and pressure their suppliers to do
likewise; companies with standard form contracts redraft and review their risk allocation;
lawyers study up in preparation for invoking the legislation in negotiation or in court; and
consumer groups receive an additional lever in their repertoire of political and legal
leverage.
The Economic Planning Agency, however, views the legislative proposal much more
instrumentally - cutting through the confusion of case law and operating as a template for
rational planning. This is unreflexive positivism, which shares some of the MITI distrust of, '
and distaste for, the court-based dispute resolution. However, if we look at drafting to date,
Japanese legislation does not tend toward prescriptive lists, but rather allows ample room
for bureaucratic and judicial discretion. The EU experience, too, tends to show that it is
difficult to precisely define unfair contract behaviour in advance. Judicial intervention
cannot be easily cut out of the governance matrix, in part because it is required for resolving
hard cases, but also because self-governing networks draw on judicial norms and de facto
rules in the development of non-legal control devices. In a sense, the self-governing network
is predicated on the availability and operation of formal legal adjudication at the outer
perimeter, to monitor and enforce internal rules and agreements.
Part of the Japanese lawyers' agenda is also professionally self-serving. It is based on a
fairly strong desire to get consumers out of the clutches of the industry and their
bureaucratic mentors and into a forum where the consumer has legal representation and
where (new) legal rules can be applied with transparency and uniformity. Although the
Japan Federation of Bar Associations does not allude to it in their 1995 report, the newly
revised Code of Civil Procedure is likely to be important here. The stated rationale for the
overhaul of the Code is to improve citizen access to civil proceedings and to rationalize
some of the time and cost barriers. The Code revisions create for the first time a small claims
jurisdiction for Japanese courts; the likely destination for consumer service contract
claims.73 Another related change is the recent increase in the number of candidates permitted
to pass the National Bar Exam. Though the formal increase in the numbers was designed to
yield more public prosecutors, the likely outcome is more attorneys, and the Federation of
Bar Associations has been vocal about its concerns about how the demographic change is
73 See eg Minjisoshoho shinkyu taisho jobun [Comparative Tables of Original and Revised Civil
Procedure Code Provisions] (1996) 1096 Jurisuto Bessatsu Furoku.
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likely to affect legal practice. Consumer transactions seem poised to become a domestic
growth area for these reasons also.
VII CONCLUSION: DEREGULATION AND RESISTANCE
What is really at stake here is not the absence or introduction of legislation as such, but
the balance of power and influence within the consumer policy network, and the struggle
over the degree to which the policy domain becomes legalised. MITI implicitly recognises
this when its Policy Office Consumer Economics Section chief primly concluded in a leading
law journal that: "What is required is not simply measures based on law, but greater
personal efforts to ensure the advance of consumer enlightenment and the adoption of
reasonable practices by private corporations".74 The telling factor is not so much the
bureaucratic homily urging consumers and corporations to try harder, but that the same
journal issue features the 1996 National Life Council report highlighting consumer service
contract problems, and that this is flanked by a number of essays by leading lawyers calling
for a consumer contracts law.75 The MITI essay, on the other hand, completely ignores
consumer service contracts and nominates the key areas for 1997 as (i) the 1996 revisions to
the Door to Door Sales Law; (ii) plans to rationalize the labeling scheme for household
products; and (iii) the implementation of the PL Law.
Part of MITI's apparent unwillingness to engage in the consumer contract debate can be
attributed to jurisdictional turf protection. In support of its governmentally-guided 'self-
regulation' scheme, MITI is now also invoking the rhetoric of deregulation: "In this
deregulatory climate ... legislation (is simply inappropriate)".76 This stance is easily
rebutted by pointing to the theory and practice of deregulation as reregulation.77 The
theoretical debate in Japan, at least as reflected in the legal literature reviewed here, is still
at a threshold stage. What we can discern is that the regulatory domain is being contested
and that the contours are shifting, and likely to shift further, perhaps toward formal "legal"
forms and forums, but within a matrix of multiple players and other techniques of
78
governance.
74 Above n 41, 18.
75 "Shoshis/la torihiki o tekiseika ni mukete [Toward the Regulation of Consumer Transactions]", above
n 43; S Ochiai, "Shohisha keiyaku ho no hitsuyosei ni tsuite [The Need for a Consumer Contracts
Law]" (1997) 608 NBL 3.
76 Above n 41, 18.
77 See eg OECD, above n 1.
78 Cf Haley's argument about the relative dominance of non-legal informality in Japan: above n 9.
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The important question, posed recently by Cotterrell, is: what do we mean by legal?79
Law and economics perspectives are currently influential outside (but not accepted within)
Japan, and tend to underpin views that the appropriate role for law and legal forums in a
deregulatory climate is to function as instruments of political and economic policy. Many
legal theorists, on the other hand, increasingly emphasise the need to view law as
necessarily linked to and proceeding from community norms (leaving aside the vexed
questions of whose norms, how these are distilled, and what judges do with them). Elements
of both sets of assumptions are evident in the writing on consumer service contracts in
Japan at present. What this snapshot suggests is that, as the question of how to curb
excesses of power in a deregulated environment governed by multiple agents becomes more
acute in Japan, consumer contract governance will change, and with it the utility of our
current theories of how law operates in Japan.
79 R Cotterrell Lore's Community (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995).
